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ABSTRACT
Human choice under uncertainty is inﬂuenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions
in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled
the “gambler’s fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks
are thought to affect decision conﬁdence, although prior work indicates conﬂicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving
red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color pre-
dictions, decision conﬁdence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n=40) and 3 (n=40) obtained trial-by-trial conﬁdence ratings, with a win/no
win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n=39) obtained a trial-by-trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each
experiment, the gambler’s fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs.
Feedback streaks exerted no reliable inﬂuence on conﬁdence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased
as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify
the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post-decision wagering”) as a straightforward
index of decision conﬁdence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Gambling games typically involve a series of independent
events such as successive draws in a lottery or the spins of
a slot machine or roulette wheel. A wealth of psychological
data over the past 50 years indicates that our predictions of
these events show systematic deviations from randomness
(Edwards, 1961; Jarvik, 1951; Oskarsson et al., 2009). Even
within a task as simple as binary guessing, multiple inﬂu-
ences of the recent event history can be observed, indicating
a fundamental ignorance of the independence of turns. The
most well-studied example is the “gambler’s fallacy”: After
a run of identical outcomes (e.g. red, red, red in roulette),
people typically predict the other outcome (i.e. black) as
due. The gambler’s fallacy has been described in ﬁeld data
from gambling venues (Clotfelter & Cook, 1993; Croson &
Sundali, 2005; Wagenaar, 1988) and investment decisions
(refer to Oskarsson et al., 2009), as well as in laboratory
studies (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Barron & Leider, 2010;
Boynton, 2003). The dominant account of this effect proposes
that humans expect small sequences to be representative of
the overall distribution from which the events are drawn. This
“belief in the law of small numbers” is considered an example
of the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972). Related accounts discuss how the scarcity of truly in-
dependent events in the real world may lead to a folk intuition
that gambling games involve sampling without replacement,
in which the gambler’s fallacy would be a reasonable
assumption (Estes, 1964; Rabin, 2002) or that long runs
may evoke a Gestalt need for closure (Roney & Trick, 2003).
In other settings, binary outcome predictions can display
the opposite pattern, such that people predict that a series
of identical events will continue rather than reverse. In the
context of sports, if a player scores with three successive
shots, spectators tend to expect the player to score with their
next attempt; this was originally described in basketball and
labeled the “hot hand” belief (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006;
Gilovich et al., 1985). Like the gambler’s fallacy, the hot
hand belief may be explained by reference to the representa-
tiveness heuristic: Observation of a streak may prompt us to
reject the assumption that the sequence is random and con-
clude instead that the events must be dependent. While both
explanations rely on representativeness, these phenomena
may be distinguished by the mechanism that generates (or
is thought to generate) the events. Croson and Sundali
(2005) pointed out that the gambler’s fallacy is observed fol-
lowing runs of outcomes generated by external devices such
as roulette wheels, whereas the hot hand is classically ob-
served where there is feedback upon human performance,
like correct/incorrect guesses or gains and losses. Hence-
forth, we distinguish outcome runs and feedback streaks in
this manner (refer also to Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Burns &
Corpus, 2004).
The behavioral response to feedback streaks is less well-
characterized than the gambler’s fallacy following outcome
runs. A seminal experiment by Ayton and Fischer (2004,
experiment 1) measured subjective conﬁdence following
red/black color predictions in a laboratory roulette task. The
gambler’s fallacy was observed on color choice, such that
the choice of either color decreased linearly as a function of
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the prior run length of that color. Conﬁdence ratings, by con-
trast, were sensitive to feedback streaks and varied in line
with the hot hand belief, increasing linearly on winning
streaks and decreasing linearly on losing streaks. By contrast,
studies of actual gambling behavior indicate a rather different
response. Structured interviews and surveys with real-life
gamblers describe a tendency to respond to losses by increas-
ing one’s bet; this is termed “loss chasing” (Dickerson et al.,
1987; Lesieur, 1984; O’Connor & Dickerson, 2003). Using
ﬁeld data from a horse-racing track, McGlothlin (1956) ob-
served that bet amounts tended to increase throughout the
day, while the “track take” ensures that most punters gradu-
ally lose over time (refer also to Ali, 1977). More speciﬁ-
cally, there was a negative correlation in McGlothin’s data
between the proportion of bettors who won on a given race
and the amount bet per gambler on the subsequent race. In
data from online poker, Smith et al. (2009) observed that ex-
perienced players responded to major losses (of over $1000
in a single hand) by becoming more aggressive on the next
hand and betting on weaker hands to stay in the game. They
responded to equivalently sized wins in the opposite manner.
These results present a contradiction if one accepts an
emerging view that the amount bet on a decision provides a
proxy for decision conﬁdence. This index of “post-decision
wagering” conveys several advantages over explicit reports
of decision conﬁdence, given its suitability for use in non-
human species in behavioral neuroscience (Kepecs &
Mainen, 2012) and the possibility for studying decision pro-
cesses outside of awareness (Koch & Preuschoff, 2007;
Persaud & McLeod, 2008; Persaud et al., 2007). Critically,
this argument would predict a parallel effect of feedback
streaks on betting behavior to that observed for subjective
conﬁdence. Thus, the ﬁndings from Ayton and Fischer
(2004) would predict that bet sizes should increase following
winning streaks and decrease following losing streaks, al-
though the gambling literature reviewed in the preceding
texts indicates the direct opposite pattern. The overarching
aim of the three experiments described here was to character-
ize these differential sensitivities of decision conﬁdence and
betting behavior to feedback streaks, with a view to under-
standing the boundary conditions under which loss chasing
can be observed in the laboratory.
Using a roulette task with binary red/black predictions,
experiment 1 sought to establish the classic gambler’s fallacy
and replicate the effects of winning and losing streaks upon
decision conﬁdence described by Ayton and Fischer
(2004). Experiment 2 tested the effects of winning and losing
streaks upon betting behavior. Together, the results of the
ﬁrst two experiments indicated a differential effect of losing
streaks upon betting behavior versus conﬁdence ratings.
Experiment 3 served as a control experiment to investigate
whether this divergence could be explained by a difference
in the payoff structure of the ﬁrst two experiments. For ex-
periment 1, our hypotheses were as follows: for color choice,
we predicted that the probability of choosing the same color
as the previous outcome would decrease as a function of the
outcome run length, demonstrating the gambler’s fallacy. We
predicted that conﬁdence ratings would be higher when
choice was consistent with the gambler’s fallacy. Moreover,
we expected conﬁdence ratings to increase as a function of the
length of winning streaks and decrease as a function of the




Forty healthy university students took part in a single testing
session lasting approximately 45min (19 males, 21 females,
average age=20years, SD=±1year). The Problem Gambling
Severity Index (Ferris &Wynne, 2001) was administered to all
participants in order to screen for potential gambling problems.
One participant was classiﬁed as a problem gambler (score=8)
and excluded from further analysis. The scores of all other vol-
unteers were under 5, with the vast majority of participants
(78%) scoring 0. Participants were reimbursed according to
their ﬁnal earnings on the task, with payments ranging between
£3.80 and £5.80 (mean=£4.55). This and the two following
studies were approved by the Psychology Research Ethics
Committee of the University of Cambridge. In accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki, all participants gave written in-
formed consent.
Task
Participants completed three practice trials and 90 experimen-
tal trials on a computer-based roulette task modiﬁed from
Ayton and Fischer (2004) and programmed in Visual Basics
2008 (Microsoft Corporation, USA). On each trial, partici-
pants were presented with a wheel consisting of 16 segments
that were alternately black and red in color. Each trial
consisted of a variable inter-trial interval (800–1200ms),
followed by a selection phase (no time limit), the wheel spin
(1000ms) and feedback window (1000ms) (refer to Figure 1).
During the selection phase, participants made a red/black
color prediction using two keys and then rated their conﬁ-
dence in that color prediction on a 9-point scale that ranged
from “no conﬁdence” to “high conﬁdence.” During selection,
a history panel presented the prior 10 red/black outcomes
across the top of the display. The history panel is a common
feature in casino roulette and was used in this context to
minimize working memory demands, which may alter the
processing of event sequences (Altmann & Burns, 2005). At
the beginning of the task, the history panel was ﬁlled arbi-
trarily and progressively updated based on the delivered out-
comes. Following the color prediction and conﬁdence ratings,
the roulette wheel spun for a short anticipation period and
then stopped on one segment, initiating the feedback phase.
Correct predictions were awarded 10 pence and accompanied
by the message ‘You won’ and a cash-machine sound. Incor-
rect predictions generated the message ‘You lost’ with an
unpleasant sound but no ﬁnancial penalty.
The trial sequence was a ﬁxed 90 trial pseudo-random se-
quence to ensure that participants experienced a sufﬁcient
number of longer color runs (refer to Table 1 for details).
The sequence contained an equal number of black and red
outcomes, with a probability of alternation of 0.48. To ensure
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that the pseudo-randomized sequence was not predictable,
we compared participants’ proﬁts against chance perfor-
mance using a one-sample t-test. Participants’ performance
did not differ signiﬁcantly from chance (t27 = 0.85, p= .40).
Data analysis
For each trial, the color prediction and conﬁdence rating
were recorded. Conﬁdence ratings were then classiﬁed as
higher (1) or lower (0) than the individual participant’s aver-
age. Trial-by-trial data was analyzed using logistic regression
in R (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria). Three primary logistic
regression models were created. Model 1 tested for the gam-
bler’s fallacy, by assessing run length (i.e. number of conse-
cutive identical color outcomes preceding the trial: 1–5) as a
potential predictor of color choice (same (1) or different (0)
from previous outcome). Model 2 tested whether conﬁdence
ratings (1, 0) were also sensitive to the gambler’s fallacy, by
including run length (1–5), color choice (1, 0), and the inter-
action of these two factors as predictors. Hence, this model
tested our second hypothesis that the gambler’s fallacy
would increase conﬁdence when predicting against the previ-
ous color following long outcome runs, reﬂected statistically
in run length× color choice interaction term. Model 3 assessed
the effects of winning and losing streaks upon conﬁdence
ratings, by including previous feedback (win (1), loss (0)),
streak length (1–4), and the interaction of these two factors
as predictors. Because correct or incorrect guesses were not
experimentally controlled, streak lengths of 5 or more were
removed from these analyses, resulting in the exclusion of
5.6% of all trials. Because we hypothesized that winning
and losing streaks would affect conﬁdence in opposite ways,
the primary effect of interest in this analysis is the streak
length×previous feedback interaction.
For all models, the inputted data consisted of a separate
data point for every trial and participant, and all models were
conducted in two hierarchical steps (Field et al., 2012). First,
participant was included as a categorical predictor, as we
considered the general tendency to reselect the previous out-
come to be a trait characteristic and thus best represented on
a participant-by-participant basis. This model provides a beta
value for each participant (not reported), which was ar-
bitrarily compared with the ﬁrst participant entered.1 At the
second step, the experimental variables of interest were
added to this model. Run and streak lengths were entered
as linear variables and tested for the linearity assumption of
the logit. Multicollinearity of predictors was tested by calcu-
lating the variance inﬂation factor and tolerance. The odds
1All models were also run with participant as a random factor, with all results
qualitatively unchanged.
Figure 1. Experimental task each trial consisted of three phases: (1) selection, in which participants ﬁrst made a color prediction and then rated
their decision conﬁdence (A, experiments 1 and 3) or placed a bet on that prediction (B, experiment 2), (2) anticipation, in which the wheel
spun, (3) feedback, in which the decision outcome was presented
Table 1. Frequencies of experienced run lengths and streak lengths [mean (SD)]
Run lengths Winning streaks Losing streaks
Run length All expts Streak length Expt 1 Expt 2 Expt 3 Streak length Expt 1 Expt 2 Expt 3
1 44 1 23 (±2) 23 (±2) 23 (±2) 1 23 (±2) 23 (±2) 23 (±2)
2 24 2 11 (±2) 12 (±2) 11 (±2) 2 11 (±2) 11 (±2) 12 (±2)
3 9 3 6 (±2) 6 (±2) 5 (±2) 3 5 (±1) 5 (±2) 5 (±2)
4 7 4 3 (±1) 3 (±1) 3 (±2) 4 3 (±1) 3 (±1) 2 (±1)
5 5 >4 2 (±2) 2 (±2) 2 (±2) >4 3 (±2) 2 (±2) 1 (±2)
Nb. run length was experimentally controlled and thus did not vary between experiments or participants. Feedback was not under experimental control, and
therefore, the average frequency for each level of winning and losing streak length is presented.
The Inﬂuence of Runs and Streaks upon Gambling BehaviorB. Studer et al.
© 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. J. Behav. Dec. Making (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
ratio (OR) and the 95% conﬁdence interval (95% CI) for this
estimate were calculated for each predictor. Model ﬁt was
assessed with pseudo R2 using the Cox–Snell statistic, and
the improvement to the model was quantiﬁed by comparing
the residual deviance (with signiﬁcant predictors included
in the model) to the deviance with only the constant and par-
ticipant included (henceforth called the null model), using a
chi-squared test. Leverage and standardized residuals were
calculated on a case wise basis, to identify cases that had un-
due inﬂuence on the model or where the model ﬁt was poor.
Unless stated otherwise, all assumptions of the model were
met, and analysis of the residuals indicated the model was re-
liable and was not unduly inﬂuenced by any single cases.
Only signiﬁcant predictors were included in the ﬁnal logistic
regression models. The statistics for non-signiﬁcant predic-
tors are reported prior to their removal from the model.
Given that we were primarily interested in assessing whether
variation in color choice and conﬁdence ratings was depen-
dent upon color runs and winning/losing streaks, participants
who consistently chose the same color and/or gave the same
conﬁdence rating (across 89 or 90 trials) were excluded from
statistical analysis. In experiment 1, 12 participants (30%)
were excluded on this basis.
Results
Effects of outcome runs
Color choice was signiﬁcantly predicted by run length,
β(SE) =0.33 (0.04), p< .001. As run length increased, the
predicted probability of choosing the same color as the last
outcome decreased, OR=0.72, 95% CI [0.66, 0.77] (refer
to Figure 2A). The pseudo R2 was 09 (Cox–Snell), and the
addition of the run length predictor signiﬁcantly improved
model ﬁt over the null model, χ2(1) = 77.6, p< .001.
Conﬁdence ratings were signiﬁcantly predicted by run
length, β(SE) = 0.14 (0.04), p< .001, such that longer runs
were associated with increased conﬁdence, OR=1.15, 95%
CI [1.06, 1.25] (refer to Figure 2B). The pseudo R2 was 27
(Cox–Snell). Color choice was not a signiﬁcant predictor,
β(SE) =0.35 (0.19), p= .07, OR=1.41, 95% CI [0.97, 2.05],
and the run length× color choice interaction term was not sig-
niﬁcant, β(SE) =0.16 (0.09), p=0.06, OR=0.85, 95% CI
[0.72, 1.00]. Addition of the run length predictor signiﬁcantly
improvedmodel ﬁt over the null model, χ2(1) =11.54, p< .001.
Effects of feedback streaks
Conﬁdence ratings did not vary reliably as a function of
streak length, β(SE) = 0.05 (0.04), p= .47, OR=1.06, 95%
CI [0.91, 1.22]. There was a signiﬁcant effect of previous
feedback, β(SE) = 0.28 (0.10), p< 0.01, OR=1.33, 95% CI
[1.10, 1.60], with higher ratings on trials following wins
than on trials following losses, but previous feedback did
not interact with streak length, β(SE) =0.08 (0.14),
p= .43, OR=0.92, 95% CI [0.75, 1.13] (refer to Figure 2C).
The pseudo R2 was 27 (Cox–Snell), and addition of the pre-
vious feedback factor signiﬁcantly improved model ﬁt over
the null model, χ2(1) = 8.71, p< .01.
Discussion
In this ﬁrst experiment, we observed a reliable effect of color
runs on participants’ predictions, such that choice of the pre-
vious outcome decreased as a function of run length. This is
a classical gambler’s fallacy effect, as seen in numerous prior
studies (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Barron & Leider, 2010;
Jarvik, 1951). The incremental change in choice behavior
as a function of run length was approximately linear (refer
to Figure 2A), similar to previous ﬁndings by Ayton and
Fischer (2004) and Barron and Leider (2010). Subjective con-
ﬁdence ratings increased at longer run lengths. From inspec-
tion of Figure 2B, it appears that the elevated conﬁdence
following longer runs was most evident when participants
choose against the last outcome, which would constitute a
further instantiation of the gambler’s fallacy. We note how-
ever that the interaction term (run length × color prediction)
only approached statistical signiﬁcance (p= .07).
C)B)A)
Preceding by win (predicted)
Preceded by win (observed)
Preceded by loss (predicted)
Preceded by loss (observed)
Figure 2. Results of experiment 1. (A) Effects of run length upon choice behavior. Graph shows the predicted (line) and observed (circles) prob-
abilities of choosing the same color as won on the preceding trial for each run length. (B) Inﬂuence of run length upon conﬁdence ratings. The
predicted probability of providing a high conﬁdence rating (line) increased with run length. Observed group averages are shown separately for trials
in which participants predicted the same (squares) versus the different (triangles) color as won on the last trial. Note that no signiﬁcant effects of
color prediction or color prediction× run length were found. (C) Effect of feedback streaks upon decision conﬁdence. The graph depicts the pre-
dicted probabilities of providing a high rating as a function of the length of preceding winning (dashed line) and losing (dotted line) streaks. The
length of winning and losing streaks did not signiﬁcantly predict conﬁdence ratings. Observed group averages of conﬁdence ratings following win-
ning (squares) and losing (triangles) streaks are also displayed. For all graphs, error bars represent SEM of the observed group data
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Conﬁdence ratings were generally higher following wins
compared with losses, but this effect did not vary as a func-
tion of the length of prior winning or losing streak. As such,
these data do not support our hot hand hypothesis and fail to
replicate the earlier results by Ayton and Fischer (2004);
some methodological factors to explain this divergence are
considered in the General discussion section. Experiment 2
moved away from conﬁdence ratings to test whether feedback
streaks systematically inﬂuence betting behavior. In this exper-
iment, participants were asked to place a bet upon their color
predictions. Thus, we effectively asked our participants to
“put your money where your mouth is,” reasoning that the di-
rect ﬁnancial consequences of a bet may enhance its sensitivity
to streak effects, relative to the subjective and inconsequential
ratings employed in experiment 1. We predicted that color pre-
dictions would follow the gambler’s fallacy, as in experiment
1, and that bet amounts would be greatest when color choice
was consistent with the gambler’s fallacy.We further predicted
that winning and losing streaks would systematically inﬂu-
ence betting behavior. This conﬂicting nature of the existing
literature did not allow a clear directional prediction for this
hypothesis: Past studies of gambling behavior indicate loss
chasing, with increased betting following losing streaks
and no strong prediction for winning streaks. However, as-
suming equivalence of betting behavior and subjective con-
ﬁdence, the Ayton and Fischer (2004) study predicts that
winning streaks would increase the amount bet and losing




Thirty-nine healthy university students (18 males, 21 females,
average age =20 years, SD=±1year) who had not partici-
pated in experiment 1 were recruited. No participants were
classiﬁed as problem gamblers.
Task
A single modiﬁcation was made to the task in experiment 1:
After the color prediction, participants were now asked to
place a bet on their color choice, in place of the subjective
conﬁdence rating. The bet response was presented on an
equivalent 9-point scale ranging from 10p to 90p, in 10p in-
crements (refer to Figure 1). If the color prediction was cor-
rect, the amount bet was added to their points score, and if
their prediction was wrong, the bet was deducted, such that
higher bets were associated with greater outcome variance,
and the expected value of any bet was zero. To accommodate
the possibility of losing money in the task, participants were
endowed initially with £5, and their ﬁnal score was paid on
completion (mean=£5.15, range £0 to £13.30).
Data analysis
Data analysis followed experiment 1, with trial-by-trial bet
size, coded as higher (1) or lower (0) than that participant’s
mean bet, replacing the conﬁdence rating. Three logistic re-
gression models were run, as described in experiment 1.
Eleven participants (28%) were excluded who consistently
chose the same color and/or placed the same bet, and trials
containing a streak length of 5 or more (4.4% of all trials)
were excluded from the regression models.
Results
Effects of outcome runs
Color choice was signiﬁcantly predicted by run length,
β(SE) =0.28 (0.04), p< .001. The predicted probability of
choosing the same color as the previous outcome decreased
as a function of run length, OR=0.75, 95% CI [0.70, 0.81]
(refer to Figure 3A). The pseudo R2 was 11 (Cox–Snell),
and the addition of the run length predictor signiﬁcantly im-
proved model ﬁt over the null model, χ2(1) = 57.64, p< .001.
Betting behavior was signiﬁcantly predicted by run





Preceding by win (predicted)
Preceded by win (observed)
Preceded by loss (predicted)
Preceded by loss (observed)
C)B)A)
Figure 3. Results of experiment 2. (A) Effects of run length upon choice behavior. Graph shows the predicted (line) and observed (circles)
probabilities of choosing the same color as won on the preceding trial for each run length. (B) Inﬂuence of Gambler’s fallacy upon betting
behavior. The graph depicts the interaction effect between run length and color prediction: The predicted probabilities of betting high increase
more steeply with run length when participants predicted that the run would be terminated (dashed line) compared with when they predicted
that the run would continue (dotted line). Group means of observed probabilities are also shown for choice same as (squares) or different from
(triangles) last outcome. (C) Differential effect of losing versus winning streaks upon betting behavior. The graph depicts the probability of
betting higher than average as a function of streak length. For losing streaks, the predicted (dotted line) and observed (triangles) probabilities
of betting high increased as streaks grew longer. In contrast, betting behavior was not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the length of winning streaks
(predicted probabilities—dashed line, observed probabilities—squares). For all graphs, error bars represent SEM of the observed mean data
The Inﬂuence of Runs and Streaks upon Gambling BehaviorB. Studer et al.
© 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. J. Behav. Dec. Making (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
[1.29, 1.55], such that longer runs were associated with a
greater likelihood of a high bet, and by color choice, β(SE)
= 0.44 (0.17), p< .01, OR=1.56, 95% CI [1.13, 2.15], with
higher bets when choosing against the previous outcome.
There was also a signiﬁcant interaction of run length and
color choice, β(SE) =0.25 (0.08), p= .01, OR=0.78, 95%
CI [0.67, 0.90], such that the likelihood of a high bet was
greatest when choosing against the previous outcome follow-
ing a long outcome run (refer to Figure 3B). The pseudo R2
was 05 (Cox–Snell), and inclusion of the three predictors
signiﬁcantly improved model ﬁt over the null model,
χ2(3) = 61.71, p< .001.
Effects of feedback streaks
Evaluation of the logistic regression model 3 showed that the
predictor streak length violated the linearity assumption.
Therefore, streak length was treated as a categorical predictor
in this analysis, and each level of streak length (2–4) was
compared with a streak length of one. Betting behavior was
differentially affected by winning versus losing streaks, as
indicated by a streak length × previous feedback interaction
(refer to Figure 3C). This interaction term reach statistical
signiﬁcance at a streak length of three, β(SE) =0.68
(0.26), p< .01, OR=0.51, 95% CI [0.31, 0.84], and four,
β(SE) =1.21 (0.37), p< .001, OR=0.30, 95% CI [0.14,
0.61], but not at a streak length of two, β(SE) =1.21 (0.37),
p= .08, OR=0.72, 95% CI [0.48, 1.04]. Streak length also
emerged as a signiﬁcant predictor (streak length of three,
β(SE) =0.38 (0.11), p< .05, OR=1.46, 95% CI [1.01,2.10],
of four, β(SE) = 0.03 (0.29), p< .001, OR=2.78, 95% CI
[1.61, 4.98], and of two, β(SE) = 0.08 (0.14), p= .54,
OR=1.09, 95% CI [0.83, 1.42]). Addition of the predictors
streak length and streak length×previous feedback signiﬁcantly
improvedmodel ﬁt over the null model, χ2(7)=27.94, p< .001.
Pseudo R2 was 03 (Cox–Snell). Previous feedback (in isolation)
was not a signiﬁcant predictor of betting behavior, β(SE) =1.03
(0.29), p= .81, OR=1.03, 95% CI [0.83, 1.28].
To decompose the streak length × previous feedback inter-
action term, separate regression models were run for winning
and losing streaks. Betting behavior was signiﬁcantly pre-
dicted by the length of losing streaks, β(SE) = 0.28 (0.07),
p< .001, such that longer losing streaks were associated with
an increase in the predicted probability of placing a high bet,
OR=1.32, 95% CI [1.15, 1.51]. In contrast, betting did not
vary signiﬁcantly as a function of the length of winning
streaks, β(SE) =0.12 (0.07), p= .07, OR=0.89, 95% CI
[0.78, 1.01].
Discussion
The gambler’s fallacy from experiment 1 was conﬁrmed in
participant’s color choices. Betting behavior was also pre-
dicted by a regressor representing the run length by color
choice interaction, such that the predicted probability of plac-
ing a high bet was greatest after longer outcome runs when
the participant committed the gambler’s fallacy. This result
demonstrates the sensitivity of the bet measure and also pro-
vides a useful indication that the gambler’s fallacy extends to
risky decisions that carry direct ﬁnancial consequences for
the participant.
Notably, experiment 2 found that betting behavior was
signiﬁcantly predicted by the length of losing streaks. In line
with the demonstrations of loss chasing from the gambling
literature, the probability of placing a high bet increased as
losing streaks grew longer. This systematic effect of streak
length extends prior laboratory work in which risk taking
increases following a single loss compared with a single gain
(Demaree et al., 2012; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002;
Leopard, 1978). The change in betting behavior following
losses was not observed following wins. This was reﬂected
in a signiﬁcant previous feedback× streak length interaction,
and there was no reliable change in the amount bet as func-
tion of the length of winning streaks.
Taken together, the results of experiments 1 and 2 imply
differential sensitivities of betting behavior versus subjective
conﬁdence ratings to losing streaks. However, there was also
a pertinent methodological difference in the payout structure
of the tasks in these two experiments: The betting measure in
experiment 2 yielded both ﬁnancial gains and losses,
whereas in experiment 1, correct color predictions resulted
in a monetary win while incorrect guesses resulted in no ﬁ-
nancial penalty. The absence of absolute losses in experiment
1 may have selectively reduced the sensitivity of that design
to the effect of losing streaks. Experiment 3 tested this alter-
native explanation by obtaining subjective conﬁdence ratings
with an inverted payoff structure, such that incorrect guesses
were ﬁnancially penalized (10 pence) and correct guesses
avoided any loss. As for experiment 1, we expected to
observe a gambler’s fallacy effect on color predictions, in-
creased conﬁdence when choice was consistent with the
gambler’s fallacy, and based on Ayton and Fischer (2004),
we predicted that conﬁdence ratings would increase as a
function of the length of winning streaks and decrease as a




Forty undergraduate students took part in the study (22
males, 18 females, age M=20years, SD=1.0), who had
not participated in the prior experiments. No participants
were classiﬁed as problem gamblers.
Task
Participants completed an identical task to experiment 1
(refer to Figure 1), with conﬁdence ratings taken on a 9-point
Likert scale from “no conﬁdence” to “high conﬁdence.” The
only modiﬁcation was to the payout structure, such that in-
correct guesses lead to a 10p deduction and correct guesses
carried no ﬁnancial outcome. To obtain comparable overall
proﬁts to experiment 1, participants received an initial en-
dowment of £9, and their ﬁnal earnings ranged between
£3.30 and £5.90 (mean=£4.40).
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Data analysis
Data analysis followed experiment 1. Nine participants
(22%) were excluded who consistently chose the same color
and/or gave the same conﬁdence rating, and trials containing
a streak length of 5 or more (5.8% of all trials) were excluded
from the regression models.
Results
Effects of outcome runs
Color choice was signiﬁcantly predicted by run length,
β(SE) =0.30 (0.04), p< .001, such that longer runs were
associated with a lower predicted probability of choosing
the same color as the previous outcome, OR=0.74, 95% CI
[0.69, 0.80] (refer to Figure 4A). The pseudo R2 was 11 (Cox–
Snell), and the addition of the run length predictor signiﬁcantly
improved the model ﬁt over the null model, χ2(1)=66.37,
p< .001.
Conﬁdence ratings were also signiﬁcantly predicted by
run length, β(SE) = 0.18 (0.04), p< .001, such that longer
runs were associated with increased conﬁdence, OR=1.20,
95% CI [1.12, 1.29] (refer to Figure 4B). The pseudo R2
was 11 (Cox–Snell). Conﬁdence was not signiﬁcantly pre-
dicted by color choice, β(SE) = 0.13 (0.16), p= .43,
OR=1.14, 95% CI [0.83, 1.57], or by the run length color
choice interaction term, β(SE) =0.12 (0.07), p= .10,
OR=0.89, 95% CI [0.76, 1.02]. The inclusion of the run
length predictor signiﬁcantly improved model ﬁt over the
null model, χ2(1) = 24.70, p< .001.
Effects of feedback streaks
As in experiment 1, conﬁdence ratings did not vary reliably
as a function of streak length, β(SE) =0.01 (0.07), p= .85,
OR=0.99, 95% CI [0.87, 1.12]. Previous feedback was a
signiﬁcant predictor of conﬁdence ratings, β(SE) = 0.32
(0.08), p<0.01, OR=1.37, 95% CI [1.11, 1.62], with higher
ratings on trials following wins compared with trials follow-
ing losses, but previous feedback did not interact with streak
length, β(SE) =0.01 (0.09), p= .93, OR=0.99, 95% CI
[0.83, 1.19] (refer to Figure 4C). The pseudo R2 for the
model was 11 (Cox–Snell), and addition of the factor previ-
ous feedback signiﬁcantly improved model ﬁt over the null
model, χ2(1) = 14.07, p< .001.
Direct comparison of betting versus conﬁdence ratings fol-
lowing losing streaks
Experiments 1 to 3 indicate qualitatively different effects of
losing streaks on the measure of betting as opposed to sub-
jective conﬁdence. To directly compare the effects across
the three experiments, we ran a logistic regression model
on the combined datasets.2 “Measure” was entered as a bi-
nary predictor contrasting experiments 1 and 3 (conﬁdence)
against experiment 2 (betting). Losing streak length and the
measure × losing streak length interaction term were also en-
tered. The differential effect was supported by a signiﬁcant
losing streak length by measure interaction term, β(SE)
= 0.28 (0.07), p< .001, OR=1.32, 95% CI [1.15, 1.51], with
losing streaks leading to an increase in bets but not in conﬁ-
dence ratings. The pseudo R2 was 19 (Cox–Snell), and the in-
clusion of the predictors losing streak length and measure
was associated with signiﬁcantly improved model ﬁt over
the null model, χ2(1) = 15.9, p< .001.
Discussion
The results of experiment 3 were qualitatively identical to
those of experiment 1. There was a reliable gambler’s fallacy
on choice behavior, such that participants were less likely to
choose either color following a longer run of that color. As in
experiment 1, participants were more conﬁdent on decisions
following win outcomes compared with loss outcomes, but
conﬁdence did not vary as a function of the length of losing
Preceding by win (predicted)
Preceded by win (observed)
Preceded by loss (predicted)
Preceded by loss (observed)
C)B)A)
Figure 4. Results of experiment 3. (A) Effects of run length upon choice behavior. Graph displays the predicted (line) and observed (circles)
probabilities of choosing the same color as won on the preceding trial for each run length. (B) Inﬂuence of run length upon conﬁdence ratings.
The predicted probability of providing a high conﬁdence rating (line) increased with run length. Observed group data are shown separately for
trials in which participants predicted the same (squares) versus the different (triangles) color as won on the last trial. Note that no signiﬁcant
effects of color prediction or color prediction × run length were found. (C) Effect of feedback streaks upon decision conﬁdence. The graph
depicts the predicted probabilities of providing a high rating as a function of the length of preceding winning (dashed line) and losing (dotted
line) streaks. No systematic effects of streak length were found. Observed group averages of conﬁdence ratings following winning (squares)
and losing (triangles) streaks are also displayed. For all graphs, error bars represent SEM of the observed group data
2This analysis is compromised by the fact that the experiments were run se-
quentially such that participants were not randomly assigned.
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or winning streaks. Thus, even with the reversal of the payoff
structure such that incorrect guesses resulted in ﬁnancial loss,
there was no reliable ﬂuctuation in conﬁdence ratings in line
with a hot hand effect, and conﬁdence ratings did not follow
the pattern of betting following losing streaks observed in ex-
periment 2. Evidently, the experience of absolute losses is
not the driving factor behind the differential ﬁndings for con-
ﬁdence ratings and betting.
We note that experiment 2 used a mixed payout structure
with both gains and losses, whereas experiments 1 and 3
used a gain-only or loss-only payout structure, respectively.
Previous research has shown that the payout domain can af-
fect risk preference (Kuhberger et al., 1999), but it is difﬁcult
to conceive why the mixed structure would generate an effect
that was restricted to losing streaks. We note that participants
are typically risk averse for mixed gambles of equal probabil-
ity (Schoemaker, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) or at
least risk neutral (Yechiam & Ert, 2011), whereas increased
betting following losing streaks is evidently risk seeking.
In summary, the results of experiment 3 strengthen the as-
sertion that the increase in betting in experiment 2 reﬂects the
particular sensitivity of this measure to losing streaks that is
distinct from subjective conﬁdence. These differential sensi-
tivities were further substantiated by a signiﬁcant interaction
of losing streak length and the measure taken, in a combined
analysis across the three experiments.
General discussion
The current study assessed the effects of outcome runs and
feedback streaks on gambling behavior in a simulated rou-
lette game with binary outcomes. Choice behavior in each
of the three experiments adhered to the classic gambler’s fal-
lacy, whereby participants chose a given outcome less fol-
lowing a longer run of that outcome. The most striking
effect of feedback streaks was seen in experiment 2, where
the likelihood of placing a high bet increased on losing
streaks. This pattern is in line with studies of naturalistic
gambling, which have documented increased risk taking fol-
lowing losses (McGlothlin, 1956; O’Connor & Dickerson,
2003; Smith et al., 2009). Our data provide evidence that this
effect is cumulative, as a function of the length of losing
streaks (refer also to Ball, 2012; Leopard, 1978). The effect
contrasts with the ﬁndings from experiments 1 and 3, in
which conﬁdence ratings were sensitive to the immediately
previous outcome (greater following wins) but showed no
signiﬁcant ﬂuctuation with the length of either kind of
feedback streak. An increase in betting after losses is also
the opposite pattern to prior demonstrations of a hot hand
effect on conﬁdence judgments (Ayton & Fischer, 2004;
Sundali & Croson, 2006).
Several aspects of these data point to a parsimonious
explanation in terms of loss chasing. First, an increase in bet-
ting serves directly to recover the recent losses. Second, this
pattern was not observed for subjective conﬁdence, plausibly
because placing a high conﬁdence rating carries no ﬁnancial
consequences. Third, the change in betting was observed for
losing streaks and was not a statistically reliable effect for
winning streaks. Loss chasing is regarded as the cardinal sign
of the problem gambler (O’Connor & Dickerson, 2003;
Toce-Gerstein et al., 2003), and it is often described as a des-
perate bid to recoup mounting debts (Lesieur, 1984; Walker,
1992). Our data help to arbitrate between two mechanistic
accounts of loss chasing. One draws upon the same notion
of negative recency as the gambler’s fallacy: As the losing
streak develops, the player believes that the streak must
break and that a win is due. In a seminal book, Lesieur
(1984 p. 52) writes that ‘if losses persisted, the gamblers
could then latch onto “losing streak” explanations’; Sundali
and Croson (2006) later referred to this as the “stock of luck”
belief. Drawing upon brain imaging data, Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al. (2008) argued that ‘loss chasing is mediated
by activity in neural systems that represent an expectation of
positive outcomes’ (pg 296). The current ﬁndings are difﬁcult
to reconcile with this account. If the increase in betting in ex-
periment 2 reﬂected a heightened expectancy of winning, we
would expect to see a similar increase in decision conﬁdence
following longer losing streaks in experiments 1 and 3. This
was not observed. The “stock of luck”mechanism would also
predict a mirrored effect after winning, that players should de-
crease their betting behavior because their good luck must run
out; this was not a robust effect in the present data.
The alternative account—and one that is supported by the
current data—draws upon prospect theory, that losing streaks
enhance the subjective value of the potential win (Coval &
Shumway, 2005; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Smith et al.,
2009).3 This is explained by the convex nature of the value
function in the loss domain. As the losing streak moves the
player progressively further from the reference point of 0,
the value of a signiﬁcant win increasingly exceeds the nega-
tive value of a further loss. This formulation is extended in
recent work by Imas (2014), who ﬁnds that the increase in
risk taking following losses is eradicated by “realizing” those
losses, i.e. the actual transfer of money, as opposed to the
“paper losses” that are inherent to a running tally. The reali-
zation of losses may prompt participants to close their mental
account and re-center them to the (prospect theory) reference
point. Within this account, the selectivity of our effect to
losing streaks is explained by the standard asymmetry that
‘losses loom larger than gains’ (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). We recognize that there is some overlap between this
explanation of loss chasing and other effects in the decision-
making literature. Financial loss chasing may be considered a
speciﬁc instance of the “sunk cost effect” (Arkes & Blumer,
1985), describing the tendency to continue a no-longer prof-
itable project that one has invested in. The “break even” hy-
pothesis (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) predicts increased betting
after losses in a speciﬁc effort to “balance the books”, i.e. to
return to the original reference point (refer also to Heath,
1995). In our task, we did not display a trial-by-trial score
in order that immediate streak history would not be
3We consider this to be conceptually similar to a “mood recovery” explana-
tion that has been described in the gambling literature, that the continued
play represents an attempt to overcome an unpleasant state induced by losing
(Browne, 1989; Walker, 1992). While this idea has mainly been applied to
compulsive gamblers, the addition of the value function helps to explain
why the gambler discounts the possibility of a further loss.
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confounded by the cumulative earnings (refer to Elliott et al.,
2000). As such, we suspect that our participants were not for-
mally aware of “breaking even”, although Heath (1995)
notes that “escalating commitment” (akin to loss chasing)
tends to be greatest under conditions where investments are
hard to track, which would apply to our task.
Our ﬁndings speak to a larger literature on the assessment
of decision conﬁdence, which posits that betting behavior
(post-decision wagering) can serve as a proxy measure of
subjective conﬁdence, for decisions that are outside of
awareness (Persaud et al., 2007) or in non-human species
that are unable to provide explicit judgments (Kepecs &
Mainen, 2012). Across the three experiments, we saw some
parallels between conﬁdence and betting. Both conﬁdence
ratings (experiments 1 and 3) and betting (experiment 2) in-
creased signiﬁcantly with outcome run length. In experiment
2, the likelihood of betting high was greatest after longer out-
come runs as participants committed the gambler’s fallacy.
This supports an assertion that betting varies in line with de-
cision conﬁdence, and notably, the same run length by
choice interaction approached signiﬁcance in experiment 1
(p= .07) and experiment 3 (p= .10). However, our clearest
effect of feedback streaks was an increase in betting follow-
ing losing streaks, which was not observed for subjective
conﬁdence ratings; indeed, conﬁdence was generally higher
following wins. This result indicates that while betting may
scale approximately with decision conﬁdence, it is also sus-
ceptible to selective inﬂuences from the economic context.
Another example of such susceptibility to economic context
was described by Fleming and Dolan (2010), who found that
post-decision wagering on a stimulus-detection task showed
patterns of loss aversion (refer also to Dienes & Seth,
2010). These effects contaminate the utility of betting as a
measure of simple conﬁdence, and raise a note of caution
for researchers interested in using post-decision wagering.
Experiments 1 and 3 demonstrated a strong gambler’s fal-
lacy effect without any reliable effect of feedback streak
length upon subjective conﬁdence. From this, we infer that
the gambler’s fallacy is a more robust phenomenon in the
psychological laboratory than any hot hand effect. Neverthe-
less, in considering our failure to replicate the seminal study
by Ayton & Fischer (2004, Experiment 1), several features
should be borne in mind. First, participants were generally
more conﬁdent following wins than losses, but this did not
vary with the length of streak. This effect, coupled with the
signiﬁcant effect of outcome runs on conﬁdence in experi-
ments 1 and 3, militate against an argument that our partici-
pants’ conﬁdence ratings were simply noisy and/or thus
lacked sensitivity. It is possible that betting is a more sensi-
tive measure than conﬁdence and that experiments 1 and 3
may have therefore lacked the statistical power to detect the
effect in experiment 2. If this were the case, we would expect
the conﬁdence intervals around the ORs (a measure of effect
size in a logistic regression) to be wider in experiments 1 and
3 compared with experiment 2; in fact, they are narrower.
However, other methodological differences may exist. A
study by Matthews (2013) on outcome runs saw that the
gambler’s fallacy following three consecutive outcomes
was sensitive to the surrounding context of shorter or longer
runs. If a similar phenomenon applies to feedback streaks,
then differences could emerge between studies as a result
of exact sequence experienced (refer also to Ball, 2012).
The overall sequence length (200 trials in Ayton and Fischer,
compared with 90 in our task) may play a role (Hahn &
Warren, 2009), and trait-like individual differences may exist,
for example, in gambling cognitions (Marmurek et al., 2013).
Conclusions
The present data help to specify the experimental conditions
under which the effects of outcome runs and feedback
streaks are observed in the laboratory. The gambler’s fallacy
was consistently seen for choice behavior in all three exper-
iments, corroborating past work on the distorted processing
of random events even in well-educated student participants.
Our observation that participants bet high after longer runs
when choosing against the previous outcome (experiment
2) demonstrates that the gambler’s fallacy also impacts on
risk-taking behavior. We saw no inﬂuence of the length of
feedback streaks on subjective conﬁdence ratings (experi-
ments 1 and 3), but betting increased as a function of losing
streak length in experiment 2. This is interpreted in terms of
loss chasing within a laboratory task, with two distinct impli-
cations: ﬁrst, that loss chasing itself may reﬂect an increase in
the subjective value of winning with no change in the per-
ceived expectancy of winning, and second, that betting be-
havior is affected by economic context to the degree that it
should not be regarded as a simple proxy for declarative con-
ﬁdence judgments.
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